OwaspDataIntegrityFailures [principle] v1.0.0

OWASP Top 10 A08:2021 (merged Insecure Deserialization + Software and Data Integrity Failures) — code and infrastructure that does not protect against integrity violations in software updates, critical data, and CI/CD pipelines.

Deserialized data from untrusted sources must be validated against a strict schema before use. Software updates, packages, and CI/CD pipeline steps must verify cryptographic signatures. Unsigned or unverified data must never be used to make authorization or code-execution decisions.

Attributed To

OWASP Foundation, Top 10 2021

Applies To

• Deserialization of Java, Python Pickle, PHP unserialize, .NET BinaryFormatter
• npm package integrity (package-lock.json integrity hashes, npm ci)
• CI/CD pipeline artifact signing and verification
• Software update mechanisms (auto-update without signature verification)
• JWT and cookie tamper detection
• CDN-hosted third-party JavaScript (subresource integrity checks)

Counter Examples

• SolarWinds 2020: Orion build server compromised, malicious DLL inserted into signed MSI before code signing step — no independent binary artifact attestation to detect the tampering.
• Python Pickle deserialization: pickle.loads(user_supplied_bytes) — arbitrary Python execution; used to gain RCE in multiple ML platforms (MLflow, Weights & Biases model registry).
• Auto-update client that fetches update over HTTP without signature check — man-in-the-middle delivers malicious installer; confirmed vector in older versions of Squirrel.Windows.

OwaspDataIntegrityFailures [principle] v1.0.0

OWASP Top 10 A08:2021 (merged Insecure Deserialization + Software and Data Integrity Failures) — code and infrastructure that does not protect against integrity violations in software updates, critical data, and CI/CD pipelines.

Deserialized data from untrusted sources must be validated against a strict schema before use. Software updates, packages, and CI/CD pipeline steps must verify cryptographic signatures. Unsigned or unverified data must never be used to make authorization or code-execution decisions.

Attributed To

OWASP Foundation, Top 10 2021

Applies To

• Deserialization of Java, Python Pickle, PHP unserialize, .NET BinaryFormatter
• npm package integrity (package-lock.json integrity hashes, npm ci)
• CI/CD pipeline artifact signing and verification
• Software update mechanisms (auto-update without signature verification)
• JWT and cookie tamper detection
• CDN-hosted third-party JavaScript (subresource integrity checks)

Counter Examples

• SolarWinds 2020: Orion build server compromised, malicious DLL inserted into signed MSI before code signing step — no independent binary artifact attestation to detect the tampering.
• Python Pickle deserialization: pickle.loads(user_supplied_bytes) — arbitrary Python execution; used to gain RCE in multiple ML platforms (MLflow, Weights & Biases model registry).
• Auto-update client that fetches update over HTTP without signature check — man-in-the-middle delivers malicious installer; confirmed vector in older versions of Squirrel.Windows.

Sources

Examples

• npm package publishing with provenance attestations (2023): packages published via GitHub Actions include a verifiable build attestation linking the package to the exact commit and workflow — consumers can verify with npm audit signatures.
• Sigstore / cosign: signs container images with keyless signing tied to OIDC identity — every Google distroless image ships with a Rekor transparency log entry verifiable offline.
• Subresource Integrity (SRI): <script src='cdn.example.com/lib.js' integrity='sha384-...' crossorigin='anonymous'> — browser refuses to execute if hash doesn't match, blocking CDN compromise.

Source

• https://owasp.org/Top10/A08_2021-Software_and_Data_Integrity_Failures/
• CVE-2019-14234 (Django insecure deserialization via Pickle in cache backend) — arbitrary code execution if attacker controls cache key.
• SolarWinds Orion supply-chain attack (2020): malicious code injected into signed build artifacts — 18,000 organizations received the trojanized update via trusted update mechanism.