Owasp Security Misconfig
Every layer of the stack (cloud, network, platform, web server, application framework, database, VM, container) must be hardened with least-privilege defaults, unnecessary features disabled, and configuration drift detec…
$ prime install @community/principle-owasp-security-misconfig Projection
Always in _index.xml · the agent never has to ask for this.
OwaspSecurityMisconfig [principle] v1.0.0
OWASP Top 10 A05:2021 — security misconfiguration is the most commonly observed issue; 90% of applications were tested for misconfiguration with an average incidence rate of 4.5%.
Every layer of the stack (cloud, network, platform, web server, application framework, database, VM, container) must be hardened with least-privilege defaults, unnecessary features disabled, and configuration drift detected automatically — default credentials and stack traces in production responses are never acceptable.
Loaded when retrieval picks the atom as adjacent / supporting.
OwaspSecurityMisconfig [principle] v1.0.0
OWASP Top 10 A05:2021 — security misconfiguration is the most commonly observed issue; 90% of applications were tested for misconfiguration with an average incidence rate of 4.5%.
Every layer of the stack (cloud, network, platform, web server, application framework, database, VM, container) must be hardened with least-privilege defaults, unnecessary features disabled, and configuration drift detected automatically — default credentials and stack traces in production responses are never acceptable.
Attributed To
OWASP Foundation, Top 10 2021
Applies To
- Cloud IAM roles and S3 bucket policies
- Web server (nginx/Apache) default pages and directory listing
- Framework debug modes (Django DEBUG=True, Rails config.consider_all_requests_local)
- Database exposure (MongoDB without auth in 2017 — 27,000+ exposed instances)
- Container images running as root with unnecessary capabilities
- HTTP security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy)
- Default credentials on network devices, admin panels, CMSs
Counter Examples
- Django deployed with DEBUG=True in production: exposes full stack trace, local variables, installed apps, and settings to any user who triggers a 500 error.
- MongoDB default config (pre-3.0): binds to 0.0.0.0 with no authentication — 2017 ransomware campaigns deleted data from ~33,000 exposed instances.
- AWS S3 bucket with public ACL applied at bucket level — data.company.com/exports/customers-2024-01.csv accessible to anyone with the URL; detected via Shodan/GrayhatWarfare.
Loaded when retrieval picks the atom as a focal / direct hit.
OwaspSecurityMisconfig [principle] v1.0.0
OWASP Top 10 A05:2021 — security misconfiguration is the most commonly observed issue; 90% of applications were tested for misconfiguration with an average incidence rate of 4.5%.
Every layer of the stack (cloud, network, platform, web server, application framework, database, VM, container) must be hardened with least-privilege defaults, unnecessary features disabled, and configuration drift detected automatically — default credentials and stack traces in production responses are never acceptable.
Attributed To
OWASP Foundation, Top 10 2021
Applies To
- Cloud IAM roles and S3 bucket policies
- Web server (nginx/Apache) default pages and directory listing
- Framework debug modes (Django DEBUG=True, Rails config.consider_all_requests_local)
- Database exposure (MongoDB without auth in 2017 — 27,000+ exposed instances)
- Container images running as root with unnecessary capabilities
- HTTP security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy)
- Default credentials on network devices, admin panels, CMSs
Counter Examples
- Django deployed with DEBUG=True in production: exposes full stack trace, local variables, installed apps, and settings to any user who triggers a 500 error.
- MongoDB default config (pre-3.0): binds to 0.0.0.0 with no authentication — 2017 ransomware campaigns deleted data from ~33,000 exposed instances.
- AWS S3 bucket with public ACL applied at bucket level — data.company.com/exports/customers-2024-01.csv accessible to anyone with the URL; detected via Shodan/GrayhatWarfare.
Sources
Examples
- Kubernetes hardening: disable anonymous authentication to the API server (
--anonymous-auth=false), use RBAC with least-privilege roles, never run privileged containers in production. - AWS Config + Security Hub: continuously evaluate resource configurations against CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark — alert on any S3 bucket that becomes public.
- Helmet.js (Node/Express): sets 11 security-relevant HTTP headers in one middleware call — CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, etc.
- GitHub Secret Scanning: automatically detects committed credentials (AWS keys, GCP SA keys, Stripe keys) and notifies before they can be exploited.
Source
- https://owasp.org/Top10/A05_2021-Security_Misconfiguration/
- OWASP Testing Guide v4.2: OTG-CONFIG — configuration testing methodology.
- Capital One 2019 breach: misconfigured WAF + overprivileged EC2 IAM role via SSRF — 100M+ customer records exposed (SSRF → metadata endpoint → credentials).
Source
prime-system/examples/frontend-design/primes/compiled/@community/principle-owasp-security-misconfig/atom.yaml